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Abstract 
Blame judgments are social acts that people use to regulate the behavior of others. Blame 
judgments are unique in that they are almost always directed at an agent. Because of this social 
aspect, blame judgments may be subject to certain social constraints such as hierarchy and status. 
The current study suggests that social status will affect judgments of blame. Additionally, the 
current study suggests that mental state inferences of intentionality, knowledge, and 
preventability may explain social statuses affect on judgments of blame. Data show that 
individuals high in social status (e.g. CEO) receive the highest amounts of blame for bringing 
about a negative event compared to individuals low in social status (e.g. Staff Member). Data 
also show that individuals high in social status were viewed as acting more intentionally, having 
more knowledge, and having a greater ability to prevent harm compared to individuals with low 
social status. This social influence on blame and its precursors suggests that, going forward, 
moral psychological research ought to broaden its view of the path to blame to include not only 
factors originating from the event (e.g., amount of harm caused), or from the perceiver (e.g., 
attitudes and prejudices), but also the social situation in which blame judgments are rendered.  
 Keywords: social status, blame judgments, mental state inferences  
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The Effect of Social Status on Blame Judgments 
 In April of 2010, BP oil company caused the largest oil spill in oil drilling history. More 
than 200 million gallons of crude oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico and it took almost four 
months to finally stop the oil from leaking into the gulf. Many species of wildlife were 
negatively affected from this incident, including many people living in the area. Following this 
event, a lot of questions were raised as to who should be held responsible. The company itself 
was fined billions of dollars but many people believed this wasn’t enough. Many focused on 
BP’s CEO, Tony Hayward. As one of the top officials in the company, Hayward was blamed for 
the accident, repeatedly testified before Congress, and eventually engaged in a widespread public 
apology campaign. Interestingly, blame for Hayward appeared to ignore the fact that he likely 
had nothing to do with the specific series of events that caused the spill; instead, people appeared 
to blame Hayward because he was a high status member of the company. The present study will 
investigate the impact of perceived status on people’s mental and moral judgments of blame. 
Whereas past research primarily conceptualized blame judgments in terms of their 
cognitive or emotional properties, blame judgments are also social.  That is, blame is a tool 
people use to regulate the behaviors of others. Blame judgments are unique in the family of 
moral judgments in that blame is nearly always directed at an agent. Unlike judgments of 
badness or wrongness, which are directed at behaviors, blame singles out and sanctions an 
individual. Because of this social aspect, blaming may be subject to social constraints like the 
requirement of warrant (i.e., justification, see; Monroe & Malle, under review) and possibly also 
constraints associated with hierarchy and status.  Recent work Ferber and Monroe (2016) 
demonstrates that the social status of moral judges affect their willingness to publicly express 
blame; however, no work to date has examined how the social status of moral judges affect 
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blameworthiness. Thus, the present work examines how the perceived social status of offenders 
affects judgments of blame as well as whether differential mental state ascriptions explains these 
effects.  
Below I review recent research outlining the process of blame. I then provide evidence 
outlining the role of causality, intentionality, reasons and obligation when carrying out blame 
judgments. Finally, I describe how target attributes―specifically perceived power and 
status―may affect this process.  
The Process of Blame 
Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe  -(2012; 2014) argue that moral judgments follow a 
specific processing path whereby perceivers integrate information about events, agents, and their 
mental states in order to arrive at a moral judgment of blame. Importantly this process can be 
quick and intuitive when information is obvious (a man holding a smoking gun over a corpse) or 
it can be slow and deliberative when information is obscured (Malle & Holbrook, 2012; Monroe 
& Malle, 2017).  
Specifically, Malle et al., (2012; 2014) argue that the process of blaming begins when 
perceivers detect a norm violation (e.g., “Joe hit Sally with a flyswatter while she was not 
looking”). After detecting a norm violation, a perceiver searches for a responsible causal agent 
(in this case, Joe). If the norm violation was caused by a non-agent (e.g., a gust of wind blowing 
the flyswatter into Sally), no blame is assigned. People may be angry at non-agents (e.g., rain on 
our picnics or rocks denting our cars), but people do not blame or admonish the rocks and the 
rain. By contrast, if the event was caused by an agent, people then attempt to determine whether 
the norm violation was caused intentionally. If the agent is perceived to have acted intentionally 
than blame is graded depending on the agent’s reason for acting. Minimal blame is assigned if 
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the agent acted for a morally justified reason (e.g., “Joe hit Sally with a flyswatter to kill the 
wasp that was about to sting her.”) and maximum blame is assigned if the agent acted for 
morally bad reasons (e.g. “Joe hit Sally with a flyswatter because he thought it was funny.”) 
Alternatively, if people perceive the agent to have caused harm unintentionally, the perceivers 
grade their judgments of blame based on the agent’s obligation and capacity to prevent harm. If 
the agent was not expected to prevent (no obligation) the event and did not have the ability or 
knowledge to prevent the event (no capacity) then perceivers assign low amount of blame; 
however, if the agent was expected to prevent the event and had the ability to do so then higher 
degrees of blame would be assigned (Malle, et al., 2012; 2014).  
Whereas few studies to date have tested the entirety of this model (see Monroe & Malle, 
2017, under review for exceptions), evidence for the importance for each of the informational 
nodes of the model is well established. Below I briefly review evidence for each of the key nodes 
of the model: causality, intentionality, reasons, and obligation. In particular, I focus on the 
intentionality and the obligation nodes of the model as the societal status of agents may affect 
people’s perceptions of these nodes.  
Evidence for Causality 
 One prominent demonstration of the effect of causality information on moral judgments 
come from Pizarro, Uhlmann, and Bloom (2003). They argue that lay assessments of moral 
responsibility are sensitive to the manner in which intentions affect outcomes, and it may be the 
case that individuals discount moral blame for actions that lack a specific link between intentions 
and actions (Pizarro et al., 2003). For example, in one study, participants were asked to judge the 
moral responsibility of an agent that: (a) saved the life of a little girl or (b) murdered his enemy 
by stabbing him with a knife. The chain of events either followed a normal causal chain (normal 
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condition) or followed a “deviant” causal chain (deviance condition). The important part here is 
that the versions of the story in the deviant condition were: the protagonist prepared to lunge 
forward (in both cases), but before he could lunge he was hit by an oncoming jogger, which 
caused him either to knock the little girl out of harm’s way, or to plunge the knife into his 
enemy’s stomach (Pizarro et al., 2003). The authors found that judgments of moral responsibility 
were discounted for both positive and negative causally deviant behaviors, even though the 
intentions clearly were the cause of the outcomes (Pizarro et al., 2003). Three additional 
experiments following this basic setup found very similar results. Across all four experiments, 
the authors found that participants reduced moral responsibility for acts that were “causally 
deviant” (acts in which intentions and outcomes were present, but not linked in the intended 
manner) (Pizarro et al., 2003). Their research suggests that people are sensitive to the way an 
agent causes harm (or help). When causality is clear cut, moral judgments are strong; however, 
when an agent harms or helps in a way that is causally strange or unexpected people blame and 
praise these deeds less, even though the outcome is identical.  
Evidence for Intentionality 
Malle (2006) argues that intentionality judgments are deeply ingrained in human 
cognition and a central component in the evaluation of responsibility and blame. Across a series 
of studies Malle (2006) developed a five-component model of intentionality that places intention 
to perform an action as the central antecedent of an intentional action. For an intention to be 
ascribed, a relevant desire for an outcome and one or more relevant belief about the action 
leading to the outcome are required; additionally, for the action to be performed intentionally, 
skill and awareness have to be present as well (Malle, 2006). Following these ideas, additional 
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authors provide evidence that speak to the relationship between intentionality and moral 
judgments. 
There is evidence to support that individuals assign more blame for acts that are 
perceived as intentional compared to acts that are perceived as unintentional (Ames & Fiske, 
2013; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Ames and Fiske (2013) found this 
to be true even when unintentional harms were equally as damaging as intentional harms. Across 
five studies, they demonstrated that people are more motivated to assign higher levels of blame 
to intentional acts compared to unintentional acts of the same magnitude. Their work suggests 
that harmful acts perceived as intentional elicit higher levels of blame compared to unintentional 
acts (Ames & Fiske, 2013). Additional work done by Lagnado and Channon (2008) found very 
similar results. That is, participants in their study rated intentional actions as more blameworthy 
than unintentional actions. Further pointing to intentionality’s effect on judgments of blame. 
Lastly, Darley and Pittman (2003) argue that the reason why intentional acts lead to higher levels 
of blame is due to the fact that individuals react with moral outrage which leads to a desire to 
punish and blame. This punishment seeks to modify future behavior through the deterrence of 
future negative acts. Darley and Pittman (2003) argue that individuals are more motivated to 
blame and assign higher levels of blame to intentional actions compared to unintentional actions 
because of a social desire to hold agents responsible for their actions. So, previous research 
provides evidence that intentional acts elicit higher levels of blame compared to unintentional 
acts and this is most likely due to a strong social desire to regulate behavior. 
The Intentional Path: Evidence for Reasons 
Woolfolk, Doris, and Darley (2006) argue that when assigning responsibility, perceivers 
closely attend to the actor’s perceived identification with an outcome. Woolfolk et al., (2006) 
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define identification in terms of an actor’s intentions, thoughts, and feelings toward committing a 
deviant act; what people might more colloquially refer to as an actor’s reasons for action. Across 
three experiments, Woolfolk et al., (2006) found that participants’ attribution of responsibility 
for an action to be influenced by the actor’s identification with the action, even when the action 
was placed under extreme coercive pressure. For example, in one study Woolfolk et al., (2006) 
demonstrate that people make more negative moral judgments of a person who is forced by 
hijackers to shoot his friend when the person harbors a secretly desire to kill his friend, compared 
to when the person lacks such a desire. In general, one might think that extreme coercion (being 
threatened with a gun) would be sufficient to reduce blame; however, this study highlights the 
impact of an agent’s reasons for acting. When the person has a secret desire to kill, people ignore 
the coercion, and blame him as if he were free. 
Similarly, Reeder, Monroe, and Pryor (2008) argue that people’s explanations of 
everyday behavior focus on the goals, reasons, or motives of agents. Using Milgram’s paradigm, 
the authors examine how people glean reason from information (e.g., what was the teacher trying 
to do?) from situational cues, and how this information shapes judgments of Milgram’s teacher’s 
moral character. In their third study, the authors found that perceivers relied on both the prompts 
issued by the experimenter (e.g. “I am responsible for this experiment; the experiment requires 
that you go on teacher.”) and the statements of concern the teacher made about the learner (e.g. 
“Mark stopped and asked the experimenter, ‘Do you want me to keep going?’”) to make 
inferences about reason and morality (Reeder, et al., 2008). When perceivers did not have this 
information they were more likely to rate the teacher as more motivated by evil than good. This 
suggests that when providing specific reasons (situational constraints) for behavior, individuals 
are more likely to blame the situation for causing an action than an agent. In their fourth study, 
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the authors sought to test this idea more directly. All participants read about a teacher who was 
completely obedient, but the level of pressure applied by the experimenter varied across 
conditions (Reeder, et al., 2008). Results from this study mirrored that of their third study, and 
also found that as the level of coercion applied by the experimenter decreased, perceivers tended 
to attribute the teacher’s behavior to relatively more hurtful than helpful motivation (Reeder et 
al., 2008).  Overall, Reeder et al., (2008) provides substantial evidence that when judging a 
person's’ morality, perceivers rely heavily on situational cues to make inferences about a 
person’s motives and moral character. This suggests that when assigning judgments of blame, 
perceivers will readily take into account various situational cues or constraints placed on an 
agent. Providing further evidence that when assigning blame, certain reasons (situational 
constraints) can affect the level of blame assigned to an agent. 
In a separate set of studies Pizarro, Uhlmann, and Salovey, (2003) highlight the 
importance of reasons by examining how people’s moral judgments are affected when a person 
endorses conflicting sets of desires. In one study, Pizzaro et al., (2003) gave participants 
information about an agent’s second-order desires and hypothesized that this would result in a 
discounting of blame. The results showed that telling participants that an agent who performed a 
negative act rejected his own impulse caused greater blame discounting. That is, participants 
assigned less blame to agents when they were presented with the agents second-order desires, 
which explained the agent’s unwillingness or regret for their transgressions. This suggests that 
blame is mitigated when an agent expresses guilt or aversion to committing a deviant act.   
The Unintentional Path: Obligation to Prevent Harm 
 In contrast to the large amount of research on causality, intentionality, and reasons. Little 
research has been done regarding obligations and their impact on blame. There is evidence to 
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support the notion that individuals who possess higher status within a hierarchy have a stronger 
obligation  to prevent negative outcomes and are blamed more for those outcomes when they 
occur (Hamilton, 1986). However, more recent work strongly suggests that an agent is not 
considered blameworthy for an action even if they are morally obligated (Buckwalter & Turri, 
2015; Chituc, Henne, Sinnott-Armstrong, & Brigard, 2016). These authors provide evidence that 
while an agent can be seen as morally obligated to perform an action (e.g. rescue a drowning 
child), participants strongly disagreed that an agent is blameworthy for failing to perform said 
action. The present work will seek to test these opposing views on obligation and blame, by 
examining whether people with higher status are perceived as more obligated to prevent harm, 
and therefore more blameworthy when they fail to do so. Below I review research examining 
how people conceptualize status and outline its possible effects on moral judgment.  
Social Effects on Blame: Hierarchy and Status 
When a morally deviant act is committed, people almost always seek an explanation as to 
why it occurred and subsequently seek to assign blame. However there are many social factors 
(e.g., power, status, etc.) that can affect the perceived blameworthiness agents. Here I review the 
evidence for social factors influencing judgments of blame, and more specifically, I focus on the 
perceived status of agents as moderator for moral judgments. 
Hierarchy and status are necessary components to maintain social order within a society. 
A linear ranking of individuals is needed to maintain order between those higher in status (e.g. a 
leader) and lower in status (e.g. a subordinate). Rai and Fiske (2011) argue that motives for 
hierarchy create moral expectations that individuals at the top of the hierarchy are entitled to 
more and better things than individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy. However, this entitlement 
does not come without a price. While those at the top of the hierarchy feel a greater sense of 
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entitlement, they may also be judged as morally responsible for the actions of their subordinates 
(Rai & Fisk, 2011; Shultz, Jaggi, & Schleifer, 1987). 
Hamilton (1978) argues that society is responsive to the fact that different roles may 
necessitate different standards of accountability. That is, superiors can be held morally 
responsible for the actions of their subordinates. Hamilton’s (1978) main argument explains that 
different roles can lead to different rules for determining responsibility, and high status roles 
invoke more stringent rule sets and therefore are subject to higher attributions of responsibility 
and blame. His work suggests that social status within a society plays an important role when 
assigning judgments of blame. Individuals actively use and incorporate this information when 
making these types of judgments. Hamilton (1978) explains that individuals perceive an agent 
with high social status, within a hierarchy, as requiring more responsibility and blame for a 
harmful act compared to an agent with low social status in the same hierarchy. 
Similarly, Pfeiler, Wenzel, Weber, and Kubiak (2017) argue that status bounds the moral 
judgments people are socially allowed to express. They show that individuals in a lower status 
positions express less anger towards someone in a higher status position for similar infractions.. 
In a social interaction, an individual may express anger in an attempt to change the behavior of 
the anger-eliciting person (Pfeiler et al., 2017); however, perceived or real status affects who is 
allowed to engage in this form of behavior regulation. Across two experiments the authors 
examine how social status determines anger expression and behavioral reactions toward 
experienced anger. In both experiments the participants were told to work on a computerized 
problem-solving task, but were constantly disturbed by a confederate making noise. Afterwards 
participants were told their performance on this task was below average; whereas, the 
confederate received praise for their performance. The results demonstrated that participants 
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expressed less anger when they had a lower status position, compared to when they were of 
equal status with the confederate (Pfieler et al., 2017).  
Similarly, evidence provided by Shultz et al., (1987) supports the claim that superiors are 
held morally responsible for the actions taken by their subordinates. In their study, participants 
were given questionnaires that contained four stories in which one person caused harm to another 
person. In each story, there was also a third person (the vicarious person) who was either equal 
or superior to the perpetrator in social status (Shultz et al., 1987). The results indicated that if the 
third person was superior in status to the perpetrator they were judged as being morally 
responsible for the actions taken by the perpetrator. The authors explain these results by arguing 
that a person who is superior in social status to the perpetrator is, in a valid sense, causally 
implicated in the resulting harm (Shultz et al., 1987). That is, within a hierarchy an individual 
with high social status is seen as being morally responsible for the actions taken by an individual 
with low social status. 
The Present Study 
The goal of the present study is to examine how perceived social status affects moral 
judgments of blame.  Three key predictions guide our study.  First, following from previous 
research, we predict that targets viewed as having higher social status (e.g., a CEO) will be 
blamed more for bringing about a harmful outcome compared to people with low status (e.g., a 
company staff member). Second, drawing on the Path Model of Blame, we predict that 
inferences about an agent’s intentionality, an agent’s knowledge, and an agent’s ability to 
prevent harm will predict moral judgments of blame. Third, I predict that inferences about an 
intentionality, an agent’s knowledge, and an agent’s ability to prevent harm will mediate the 
effect of perceived status on blame. 
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Methods 
Participants 
We recruited a total of 246 participants from Appalachian State University subject pool. 
Participants were compensated with course credit. Of the 246 participants, 39 identified as male 
and 207 identified as female. The average age in the sample was 19.49 years (SD = 1.63).  
Design and Procedure 
The experiment manipulated perceived status using a four-level within-subjects design. 
Participants read a brief vignette where a company begins a new program that has a foreseeable 
effect of harming the environment (see below). 
“A company has decided to invest in a new program. This program will almost double 
the company’s annual earnings but in turn will harm the environment. While the company is 
aware of the effect of causing harm to the environment they decide to move forward with the 
new project. In the end, everything precedes as anticipated: the new program doubles the 
company’s annual earnings and the environment is harmed.” 
  After reading the vignette participants were asked to make judgments about four different 
agents, each with different levels of status in the company: the company CEO (high status); the 
Operations Manager (medium status), a Staff member (low status), and a Shareholder (very low 
status). The order of the agent was randomized for each participant. Each participant responded 
to same four questions for each agent: “How much blame would you assign [agent] for harming 
the environment?” (0 no blame - 100 lots of blame). “Did the [agent] intentionally harm the 
environment?” (1 absolutely no - 7 absolutely yes); “Did the [agent] know the environment 
would be harmed?” (1 absolutely no - 7 absolutely yes); and “Could the [agent] have prevented 
the harm to the environment?” (1 absolutely no – 7 absolutely yes). 
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Afterwards, participants were presented with all four agents and were asked to allot the 
proportion of blame each one deserved: “Thinking about the four people you just evaluated, what 
share of the blame do you think each agent deserves (Numbers must sum to 100)?” Following 
this measure, participants responded to a manipulation check question that assessed participants’ 
perceptions of the agents’ status: “How much status do the following people have in the 
company?” This was measured using a sliding bar scale (0 none - 100 lots) for each agent. 
Lastly, participants completed a short demographic measure and were debriefed and thanked.  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
We first tested whether participants perceived the agents to possess differential amounts 
of status using a within-subjects ANOVA. The analysis confirmed the prediction. Participants 
perceived the CEO as possessing the most status (M = 95.02, SD = 10.20), followed by the 
operations manager (M = 76.28, SD = 16.78) and, the shareholder (M = 41.54, SD = 27.78), and 
staff member (M = 34.43, SD = 19.59), F(3,717) = 591.7, p < .001, partial ƞ
2
 = .71. Planned 
contrasts demonstrated that participants perceived the CEO as having significantly more status 
than the operations manager (p < .001), and the operations manager had more status than the 
shareholder and the staff member (p < .001); the shareholder and staff member, however, were 
perceived as having equal (and low status, p = .001). 
Effects of Status on Blame and Mental State Ascriptions 
I predicted that agents with higher perceived status would be perceived as more 
blameworthy, more knowledgeable, more able to prevent harm, and as causing harm 
intentionally compared to agents with lower perceived status.  I tested these predictions using 
four within-subjects ANOVA (one for each judgment). The analyses confirmed each of my 
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predictions. Status significantly affected blame judgments, F(3,684) = 172.1, p < .001, partial ƞ
2
 
= 0.43 (See Figure 1). Additionally, perceived status affected mental state judgments, including: 
knowledge ascriptions, F(3,735) = 116.5, p < .001, partial ƞ
2
 = .32; perceptions of preventability, 
F(3,735) = 130.8, p < .001, partial ƞ
2
 = 0.35; and intentionally attributions, F(3,735) = 138.9, p < 
.001, partial ƞ
2
 = 0.36 (See Figure 2). Across each inference, the high status agent (i.e., CEOs) 
received the strongest judgments of blame, knowledge, preventability, and intentionality, 
followed by the moderate status agent (i.e., the operations manager), and judgments of blame, 
knowledge, preventability, and intentionality were lowest for the low-status staff member and 
shareholder.  
Status and Zero-Sum Blame Ascriptions 
In addition to examining how people ascribe blame to agents with different status, we 
sought to test whether this effect replicates when we explicitly put the agents in tension with one 
another by asking people to make zero-sum blame judgments. To test this prediction, we asked 
participants to decide on the proportion of blame each agent deserved, but the total blame could 
not sum to more than 100%.  We used a within subjects ANOVA to test this prediction. The 
results indicated that the largest amount of blame was assigned to the CEO (M = 52.84, SD = 
17.87), followed by the Operations Manager (M = 26.40, SD = 12.71), the Shareholder (M = 
10.85, SD = 8.62) and finally the Staff Member (M = 9.92, SD = 6.70), F(3,735) = 490.8, p < 
.001, partial ƞ
2
 = 0.67. Planned contrasts demonstrated that the CEO received a significantly 
larger share of blame compared to the other three agents (ps < .001). The operations manager 
received the second largest share of blame, receiving significantly more blame than the staff 
member and the shareholder (ps < .001). The shareholder and the staff member received the least 
and equivalent amounts of blame (p = .16) 
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Mediation Analysis 
Additionally, we conducted a mediation using bootstrapping with 10,000 samples 
(Hayes, 2013, model 4).  The mediation analysis showed that the initial direct effect of perceived 
status on blame was significant, b = 0.474, SE = .079, 95% CI [0.318, 0.631]. Additionally, 
perceived status predicted perceived knowledge, b = 0.018, SE = .006, 95% CI [0.006, 0.030], 
intentionality, b = 0.019, SE = .006, 95% CI [0.006, 0.031], and the ability to prevent harm, b = 
0.023, SE = .006, 95% CI [0.012, 0.034]. Entering status, knowledge, intentionality, and ability 
to prevent harm, simultaneously into the model showed a significant indirect effect, indicating 
mediation, indirect b = 0.184, SE = .061, 95% CI [0.069, 0.307]. The direct effect of status on 
blame was still significant, though substantially smaller, b = 0.290, SE = .066, 95% CI [0.161, 
0.420]. Moreover, blame judgments were significantly predicted by perceived knowledge, b = 
4.643, SE = .879, 95% CI [2.911, 6.375] and intentionality, b = 3.372, SE = .755, 95% CI [1.886, 
4.859], and the ability to prevent harm, marginally predicted blame, b = 1.633, SE = .841, 95% 
CI [-0.024, 0.420]. 
Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to examine how perceived social status affected moral 
judgments of blame as well as whether different mental state ascriptions could explain these 
effects. First, we predicted that individuals perceived as having higher social status (e.g., CEO) 
would be blamed more for bringing about a negative event than individuals perceived as having 
lower social status (e.g. a company staff member). The results confirmed this prediction. We 
found that individuals viewed as having high social status were assigned higher levels of blame 
for bringing about a negative event compared to individuals low in social status.  
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Second, we predicted that inferences about an intentionality, an agent’s knowledge, and 
an agent’s ability to prevent harm would predict moral judgments of blame. Whereas individuals 
with high social status would be perceived as having greater intentionality, knowledge, and the 
ability to prevent a harmful event compared to individuals with low social status. The results also 
confirmed this prediction. Individuals high in social status were viewed as acting more 
intentionally, having more knowledge, and having a greater ability to prevent harm compared to 
individuals with low social status. This suggests that one reason why people ascribe more blame 
to individuals with higher social status is because they perceive high status individuals having 
more morally-relevant mental states (e.g., more intentionality).  
Third, we predicted that inferences about intentionality, knowledge, and an agent’s ability 
to prevent harm would mediate the effect of perceived status on blame. The results largely 
confirmed this prediction. We found that intentionality inferences and knowledge ascriptions 
significantly mediated the effect of status on blame, and judgments of an agent’s ability to 
prevent harm were marginally significant mediators of blame. That is, the degree to which a 
participant perceived an agent as having higher status, they also viewed that agent as acting more 
intentionally, having more knowledge, and having a stronger ability to prevent harm; these 
factors then in turn explained people’s increased blame judgments of the agent. Importantly, 
however, these mental state factors only partially mediated the effect of perceived status on 
blame. Thus, this suggests that when assigning blame, status exerts both a direct effect on blame 
(i.e., more status results in more blame) and an indirect effect on blame via mental state 
ascriptions of intentionality, knowledge, and preventability. 
 Previous research has outlined the importance of intentionality, preventability, and 
knowledge when making judgments of blame (Malle et al., 2012). Following the Path Model of 
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Blame, these mental state ascriptions play an important role when assigning blame to an agent. 
The current study adds to this body of research by further pointing to the importance of these 
mental state ascriptions. We showed for the first time that these mental state ascriptions can 
predict the level of blame assigned to an agent of perceived social status. Agents higher in social 
status are viewed as bringing about a harmful event more intentionally, possessing more 
knowledge about a harmful event, and having a greater ability to prevent a negative event 
compared to agents lower in social status. Higher levels of these mental state ascriptions 
predicted higher levels of blame.  
Future research should seek to expand these findings through additional studies. 
Specifically, the current study assessed social status within a company setting; however future 
research could expand on this effect by examining status in different domains (e.g., politics). Due 
to the novelty of this study it is crucial that future research expands on the role of mental state 
ascriptions when assigning judgments of blame. Additionally, one explanation for the present 
findings is that people have a stronger desire to blame individuals at the tops of organizations 
(relative to more junior individuals).  Thus, one question for future work to consider is whether, 
when people view high-status people behaving immorally, this inspires increased feelings of 
resentment or anger, which in turn causes people to inflate their beliefs that high status people 
could have stopped the event, knew what they were doing or acted intentionally, thereby 
increasing blame. As the present studies did not assess people’s affective responses to the 
immoral behavior, we cannot rule out this explanation, and we believe it would be an exciting 
avenue for future work.  
 Despite these limitations, the present findings suggest that decisions about blame are 
cognitive as well as deeply social.  With regard to the cognitive aspect, I demonstrate, consistent 
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with past research, that blame judgments are responsive to variations in agents’ perceived mental 
states (e.g., knowledge and intentionality) as well as agent’s perceived ability to prevent harm.  
Importantly, however, my study goes beyond reifying the cognitive inputs to blame to 
demonstrate the social framework in which decisions to blame are situated. That is, even when 
the details of an event are identical (a company makes decision that harms the environment), 
people appraise the mental states and moral standing of the individuals involved differently 
based on their perceived social status. This social influence on blame and its precursors suggests 
that, going forward, moral psychological research ought to broaden its view of the path to blame 
to include not only factors originating from the event (e.g., amount of harm caused), or from the 
perceiver (e.g., attitudes and prejudices), but also the social situation in which blame judgments 
are rendered.  
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Figure 1. The assignment of blame judgments. This figure illustrates the amount of blame that 
was assigned to each agent, averaged across all participants. 
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Figure 2. The assignment of mental state inferences. This figure illustrates the level of mental 
state ascriptions that were assigned to each agent, averaged across all participants. 
 
